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Abstract: This paper provides an overview and analysis of the East Asian economic 
crisis which began in 1997. It provides an assessment of the nature and prospects for 
East Asian style capitalism in a global environment, and analysis of competing 
explanations of East Asia’s successes and failures. 
 
A revised  version of this paper appeared in Politics and Markets in the Wake of the 





In the middle of 1997 East Asia was gripped by a major financial crisis that shows little 
sign of abating. What was initially taken to be a relatively isolated  shock has intensified 
and generated increasingly widespread economic and political effects which threaten to 
overturn much of the region’s established political and economic order. These events  
have been remarkable enough in themselves. For observers of the region there has been 
an additional, if rather less traumatic consequence of the crisis: quite simply, it has 
forced a major reassessment of our understanding of the way political and economic 
activity is organised within the region, and about the place of the region in an 
increasingly integrated international system.  
 
The key question to emerge in the wake of the crisis is whether we are witnessing the 
end of Asian capitalism in its various dirigiste or predatory manifestations. In short, have  
East Asian forms of capitalism been undone by inherent structural contradictions that 
make them simply unsustainable, or have they been undermined by an external forces 
associated with global financial markets and the activities of powerful actors like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the United States? Whatever the origins of the 
crisis, is ‘Asian capitalism’ in the process of moving toward a more liberal, market-
centred order? 
 
Despite differences in emphasis on global and domestic factors, on institutional and 
social factors, there is a general  belief amongst this volume’s authors that it is simply 
not possible to understand the recent events in East Asia without considering the 
integrated nature of economic and political factors. Although one of the central 
questions with which this entire volume seeks to deal revolves around the form and 
future of capitalist organisation in East Asia, it is worth emphasising at the outset that 
any form of economic organisation is ultimately an expression of institutional 
frameworks and the particular sorts of social relations embedded in them.  In other 
words, although there are some fairly basic qualities which define capitalism anywhere, 
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its specific manifestation will reflect the particular constellations of political and 
economic power within which it is embedded. Hence, the volume is distinguished by its 
questioning of the neo-classical/rational choice proposition that capitalist markets are 
mechanisms defined by natural laws of equilibrium, and driven by the rational choices 
of utility-maximising individuals. 
 
Before introducing the region’s more distinctive modes of political and economic 
organisation, we shall provide a brief sketch of the crisis itself, and indicate the scale of 
its impact. The broad intention of this chapter is to indicate the main themes that run 
through the volume and give a preliminary indication of the other contributions that 
make it up. In addition, we shall identify some of the key questions which have emerged 
from the crisis. At the outset let us broach the most fundamental of all: is this a crisis of 
East Asian capitalism, or a crisis of capitalism more generally? As the impact of the 
crisis spreads relentlessly outwards, are the problems being revealed by its progress less 
to do with the ‘crony capitalism’ of Asian business–government relations, or even the 
‘irrational exuberance’ of financial markets, than they are with the contradictory and 
inherently crisis-prone nature of capitalism in general? 
 
What the analyses contained in this volume reveal is the complexity of the factors that 
have not simply shaped the crisis, but which are determining its continuing evolution.  
Central in this regard are an array of national and international forces that are 
increasingly and overtly political. Whether it is the contest to shape domestic policy 
responses in Korea, or the friction between IMF and Indonesia, the crisis has never been  
simply an economic event. Indeed, the IMF’s role is indicative of the essentially political 
impact of nominally economic policy advice. The IMF has  provoked both resistance 
and enthusiasm,  influencing  the struggle over policy agendas throughout the region, 
and being instrumental in the downfall of the governments of Korea, Thailand and, most 
dramatically, Indonesia. Significantly, the results and dynamics of such struggles have 
been different in each country. Exactly why is a matter of contention, with some 
stressing the clash between global financial markets and domestic institutions, while 
others emphasise the importance of constellations of power and interest in shaping 
outcomes. 
 
It is precisely because the crisis is an inescapably political phenomenon, however,  that 
the essays collected here are able to shed such a penetrating light on what is arguably the 
most important event in the region, if not the world, since the end of the Second World 
War. To put the matter somewhat baldly, what is at stake here is the future pattern of 
economic and political organisation in a region which was until recently routinely taken 
to be the most dynamic on earth. However - or whenever - the crisis is resolved, the 
nations of East Asia will continue to be of primary importance, if for no other reason 
than a substantial proportion of the world’s population lives there. What is of equal 
importance, therefore, is the region’s relationship with the rest of the world. The 
spreading of crisis demonstrates that, for good or ill,  East Asia now has the capacity to 
move the world. 
 
While immediate policy attention  focuses on whether existing regimes can emerge 
intact from the crisis by introducing Keynesian reflationary policies or by attempting to 
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control domestic and global capital markets, the crisis begs other, more fundamental 
questions. For example, are Asian forms of capitalism simply in transition towards a 
universal capitalist model shaped by an intrinsic instrumental rationality? Or may 
various capitalisms exist within a range of institutional frameworks? Most importantly, 
how do economic systems change? 
 
In the intense debate that has emerged in the time since the crisis took hold, there major 
questions have emerged. First, is the crisis a phenomenon that has its roots in changes in 
the structure of global capital markets that make economies more unstable (Sachs, 
Krugman, Winters), or in movements in currencies that change international coemptive 
advantages (Haggard and McIntyre)? Or were the crises generated from within, 
propelled by shifts in the balance of power and interest among political and social 
coalitions or the collapse of institutions? While there is a general recognition that 
particular outcomes must be explained in terms of the interaction between a range of 
political and economic factors at both the domestic and global levels, the authors in this 
book nevertheless privilege particular forces. 
 
Winters,  Higgott and  Leaver, for example, emphasise factors at work in the global 
political economy, whereas Weiss and Hobson,  Moon and Rhyu, Kim and Lee, and 
Kim all suggest that the disintegration of institutional capacities within particular 
economies is at the heart of the region’s problems. For Robison and Rosser, Khoo, and 
Hewison, shifts in the architecture of power or interest have played an especially critical 
role. Beeson and Bell, by contrast, suggest that all of these factors have affected 
Australia’s relationship with the region. Clearly, there is a good deal of debate about 
where the appropriate explanatory emphasis should lie even amongst broadly 
sympathetic scholars.  In order to better appreciate such differences of opinion, it is as 
well to remind ourselves of both its origins and impact. 
 
 
Measuring the meltdown 
 
Although the crisis has by now become a staple of popular commentary, it is important 
to remind ourselves at the outset of quite how profound a transformation there has been 
in the fortunes of the region. Jeffrey Winters (Chapter ??) provides a detailed analysis of 
the dynamics that drove the initial currency crisis, which we shall complement here by 
briefly sketching its impact on the region. Having done that, we locate the countries of 
East Asia within an overarching global framework. For as Richard Higgott observes in 
chapter ??, the East Asian crisis is also the first ‘crisis of globalisation’. It is important, 
therefore, to say something about the increasingly inter-connected and internationalised 
system within which the East Asian meltdown occurred. This will enable us to begin the 
task of establishing how much of the current crisis is a product of the problems of East 
Asian capitalism, and how much may be a function of longer term changes in the wider 
global political economy. 
 
The possibility that a number of  East Asian economies might have potentially serious 
problems first became really apparent as a consequence of the Thai currency crisis. 
While there were a number of earlier warning signs that might – indeed, should – have 
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caused concern in retrospect (see the chapters on South Korea by Moon and Rhyu, and 
by Kim in this volume, for example), these were overlooked in the euphoria associated 
with the generalised ‘East Asian miracle’. As Kevin Hewison points out in chapter ??, 
the Thai developmental experience has been highly distinctive and has little in common 
with many other countries, yet there was little recognition of these differences or the 
potential for the Thai economy to collapse. What was perhaps an even greater shock was 
the possibility that the problems of one economy might by transmitted through the so-
called ‘contagion effect’ to other economies with little obvious connection, other than 
inescapable geographical contingence. As Figure 1 demonstrates, however, the impact 
when it came was all too real. 
 
Not only did currencies like Indonesia’s rupiah lose about 80 per cent of its value in the 
space of a few months, but regional equity markets were equally decimated as 
‘investors’ scrambled to leave what were perceived to have become highly risky 
investment prospects. This rapid capital exit which has clearly been central to the scale 
and rapidity of the transformation of the region’s position becomes more 
comprehensible when the composition of capital is considered. As Table 1 shows, the 
economies of the region in general, and Southeast Asia in particular, had increasingly 
utilised and become dependent on highly liquid forms of portfolio or bank mediated 
credit. Such inflows of capital were generally denominated in US$ and – compounding 
the potential risks of this strategy – unhedged. 
 
The consequences of a growing reliance on ‘hot’ money from the world’s increasingly 
integrated and massive financial markets have by now become all too apparent. As a 
number of the contributors in this volume make clear, a strategy of currency ‘pegging’ 
was always fraught with potential danger: not only was it always vulnerable to 
speculative attacks from the world’s financial markets, but it systematically undermined 
the competitive position of the overall economy. 
 
Table 1. External Financing for Five Asian Economies 
($US billions) 




   
External financing, net 47.4 80.9 92.8 15.2 15.2
   
Private Flows, net 40.5 77.4 93.0 -12.1 -9.4
Equity investment 12.2 15.5 19.1 -4.5 7.9
Direct Equity 4.7 4.9 7.0 7.2 9.8
Portfolio Equity 7.6 10.6 12.1 -11.6 -1.9
   
Private Creditors 28.2 61.8 74.0 -7.6 -17.3
Commercial banks 24.0 49.5 55.5 -21.3 -14.0
Non-bank private creditors 4.2 12.4 18.4 13.7 -3.2
   
Official flows, net 7.0 3.6 -0.2 27.2 24.6
International financial institutions -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 23.0 18.5
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Bilateral creditors 7.4 4.2 0.7 4.3 6.1
   
Resident lending/other, net -17.5 -25.9 -19.6 -11.9 -5.7
   
Reserves excluding gold (= increase) -5.4 -13.7 -18.3 22.7 -27.1
 
Notes: (I) South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines; (ii) including 
resident net lending, monetary gold, and errors and omissions; (iii) e = estimate, f = IIF 
forecast.  Source: Institute of International Finance. 
 
 
Equally rapid was the transmission of these financial sector shocks to the underlying 
‘real’ economies on the region. We shall say more about this important distinction 
below, but at present we merely want to emphasise the scale of the downturn in the 
troubled economies. As Tables 2 and 3 indicate, across a number of key indices like 
unemployment, interest, inflation  and growth rates, the position of the East Asian 
economies has been profoundly altered. From being synonymous with unparalleled 
growth rates and seemingly limitless prospects, the region now finds itself at the centre 
of an equally dramatic downward spiral of negative growth and rising unemployment.  
 
 




Prime Rate (%) 
 Jun 97 Jun 98 Jul 97 Jul 98 
China   6.8 (Apr 98) 
Hong Kong 2.5 4.2 8.75 10.0 
Indonesia 14.2 16.8 18.25 65.0 
Malaysia 2.7 5.0 9.45 12.1 
Philippines 10.4 13.3 14.5 18.0 
Singapore 1.7 2.2 6.0 7.5 
S. Korea 2.6 6.9 8.5 11.5 
Thailand 3.0 8.8 13.25 15.5 
Source: JP Morgan Asian Financial Markets: Third Quarter 1998. Singapore April 24, 1998. 
[http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/afm2.pdf]; Asiaweek. ‘Charting the Crisis.’ July 17th 1998: 41. 
 
 
Table 3: Economic Growth & Inflation 
 
Country Economic Growth (%) Inflation (%) 
 1996 1997e 1998f 1999f 1996 1997e 1998f 1999f 
China 9.7 8.8 6.5 6.0 8.3 2.8 -2.8 -0.5 
Hong Kong 5.0 5.3 -3.0 1.6 6.0 5.7 3.2 -2.4 
Indonesia 8.0 4.5 -14.0 -3.5 7.9 6.6 60.0 27.0 
Malaysia 8.6 7.2 -5.1 0.1 3.5 2.7 6.1 6.7 
Philippines 5.8 5.2 0.4 4.0 8.4 5.1 10.0 7.5 
Singapore 7.0 7.8 0.0 0.1 1.4 2.0 1.3 1.7 
S. Korea 7.1 5.5 -6.0 2.6 5.0 4.4 8.0 3.0 
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Thailand 7.7 0.5 -6.0 2.5 5.8 5.6 10.0 6.0 
Source: JP Morgan Asian Financial Markets: Third Quarter 1998. Singapore April 24, 1998. 







Table 4  International Claims Held by Foreign Banks 
(billions of US dollars) 













Indonesia 44.5 27.6 55.5 34.2 58.7 34.7
Malaysia 16.8 7.9 22.2 11.2 28.8 16.3
Philippines 8.3 4.1 13.3 7.7 14.1 8.3
Thailand 62.8 43.6 70.2 45.7 69.4 45.6
Korea 77.5 54.3 100.0 67.5 103.4 70.2
TOTAL 209.9 137.5 261.2 166.3 274.4 175.1
 
Source: Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘The Onset of the East Asian Financial 
Crisis,’ World Wide Web document, URL: 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html, citing Bank for 
International Settlements data. 
 
The long-term position of a number of the most badly affected countries is further 
constrained by their external debt positions. As Table 4 indicates, not only do the 
troubled economies share significant debt burdens, of which a substantial portion is 
short-term, but this further compounds negative sentiment toward them by potential 
external investors or creditors. Quite how dramatically the position of the troubled Asian 
economies has deteriorated is demonstrated in Table 5, which indicates the extent of 
non-performing loans throughout the region. 
 
Table 5. Non-Performing Loans 









Hong Kong 1.5 3
 
Note: The figures for 1998 are forecasts 
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Source: Giancarlo Cosetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini, ‘What Caused the Asian 
Currency and Financial Crisis,’ World Wide Web document, URL: 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html, citing JP Morgan data. 
 
 
Although  the crisis has assumed an increasingly regional dimension, sweeping up one 
country after another in an expanding and seemingly irresistible downward spiral, it is 
important to recognise that it has generated different effects in different countries. In 
order to try and untangle those aspects of the crisis that appear to be connected with 
possibly universal problems of capitalism-in-general, and those that may be more 
specifically connected to ‘Asian’ forms of capitalism, it is important to try and unpack 




The End of Asian Capitalisms? 
 
One of the most important issues to emerge during the crisis has centred on the way 
economic activity has been organised in East Asia. A good deal of attention has been 
devoted – particularly by the IMF - to developing plans to remedy the perceived 
shortcomings of Asian capitalism. Before the technical merits of such questions can be 
considered, however, it is vital to develop a clearer understanding of the much invoked 
term ‘Asian capitalism’.  In particular, we need to consider how East Asian forms of 
capitalism are organised differently from their counterparts in the Anglo-American 
economies. To understand how the East Asian variations on the general theme of 
capitalist development diverge from theoretical abstractions, therefore, we need to place 
them in specific social and historical contexts. 
 
Capitalism in context 
 
Although the defining qualities of capitalism – market-oriented commodity production; 
private ownership of the means of production; the necessary sale of labour power by the 
majority of the population;  acquisitive, maximising behaviour on the part of individuals 
(Hunt 1979: 2) - are well enough known, they merit repetition, as it is important to 
remember that they are not simply timeless, universal or ‘natural’ givens, but dependent 
upon  particular  constellations of power and interest for their realisation. In other words, 
although capitalism as an abstraction may have enduring qualities that lend  it analytical 
utility, the  way the institutions and social practices that constitute capitalism are 
actually manifest vary from one historical setting to another. Whether these different 
forms are stages on the road to a single model or constitute viable alternatives is another 
question, one that is clearly of central importance in the context of the crisis. 
 
The expansion of capitalism from its original European home to encompass not just Asia 
but the entire world made the idea of considering capitalism as one, all-encompassing  
global system increasingly attractive and appropriate. Whether the ‘core-periphery’ 
schema (Wallerstein 1974) is the most appropriate way of conceiving of an increasingly 
internationalised and interconnected system is another question, however. If there is one 
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thing the pre-crisis performance of Japan and the so-called newly industrialising 
countries (NICs) seemed to demonstrate unequivocally, it was that economic 
development outside the ‘core’ was not only possible but could be achieved much more 
quickly than had been the case in Europe (Amsden 1990).  
 
Yet in an increasingly global and interconnected political-economy it is not clear 
whether any region or country, no matter what form of economic policy or social system 
it favours, can insulate itself from major systemic disturbances elsewhere. This is an 
especially significant consideration given that one of capitalism’s defining historical 
qualities has been a chronic proclivity for deep seated cyclical shifts that manifest 
themselves as ‘booms’ and ‘busts’ (Goldstein 1988). A key question, therefore, is 
whether the current crisis in East Asia is simply a ‘normal’ reflection of the internal 
dynamics of capitalism in general, or whether such inherent instability is compounded 




Few would argue with the proposition that there are particular qualities which set 
capitalism apart in East Asia. Yet within this encompassing conception of  ‘East Asia’ 
there are a number of distinctive historical  patterns of development,  very different 
types of  state-business relations, as well more broadly conceived generic types of 
capitalist organisation. In trying to understand the way the crisis is likely to impact on 
the region it is important acknowledge these contingent factors as they will inevitably 
help shape the post-crisis political and economic order. 
 
 If one idea encapsulates a Northeast East Asian approach to economic management in 
particular, or is synonymous with the region’s political economy more generally, it is the 
‘developmental state’ (Johnson 1982). Pioneered by Japan, the developmental state is 
associated with a range of essentially mercantilist trade and industry policies that are 
designed to force the pace of industrialisation and promote national economic 
development. Central to this developmentalist project is the desire to harness the totality 
of resources available within the politically demarcated space over which the state 
claims authority in pursuit some notion of a ‘national interest’. 
 
In Japan, the imperatives of post-war reconstruction provided the legitimating rationale 
for the single-minded pursuit of economic growth. While the desire for  rapid economic 
growth may not have been an exclusively Japanese preoccupation, what distinguished 
Japan was the way its governing elite set about achieving it. The underpinning dynamic 
in Japan was still capitalist, but because the pursuit of profit occurred within a 
contingent  Japanese context - with all the historical specificity that implies - it 
effectively harnessed capitalist dynamism to national purpose (Tabb 1995: 199). In 
short, what emerged in Japan was a form of coordinated capitalism which effectively 
consolidated and was mediated by existent social relationships and institutionalised 
patterns of organisation. Of central importance in this regard was the structure of the 
state-business relationship. Not only was the bureaucracy in Japan technocractically 
competent and capable of providing a blueprint for national reconstruction, but they had 
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sufficiently close links with, and  leverage over, local business to ensure that their plans 
could be carried to fruition (Calder 1988). 
 
Japan has a wider significance in the context of the current crisis. First, not only is Japan 
still by far the most important economic power in the region, but it has provided an 
important developmental exemplar for other East Asian nations. The first generation of 
NICs to emerge after Japan, especially Taiwan and South Korea were directly influenced 
by the Japanese during the latter’s period as a colonial power (So and Chiu 1995), 
reproducing a range of Japanese-inspired industrial structures, policies, and state-
business relations. A second generation of NICs in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand have subsequently  been caught up in a complex web of production 
structures, loan and aid packages which have tied them to Japanese companies as they 
have expanded into the region (Hatch and Yamamura 1996). A second, more subtle 
Japanese influence has been ideational. East Asian economic development has been 
premised on the idea that domestic governments – unlike their counterparts in the 
Anglo-American nations – could and should  lead rather than follow markets (Wade 
1990). In short, thinking about economic development and the appropriate role of 
government in that process has been shaped by a range of influences and economic 
models that are significantly different from the nostrums and idealisations that are 
associated with the neoclassical economic orthodoxy that predominates in countries like 
Australia and the US (Fallows 1993). In short, Japan has developed a generic form of 
capitalism that stands as a distinct alternative to the sort of model that the IMF is 
currently trying to impose on the region. 
 
Yet the currently parlous state of the Japanese economy raises import questions about 
the competence and capacity of public servants and governmental agencies in an 
increasingly complex and inter-linked global political-economy. The numerous 
corruption scandals that have plagued the hitherto highly esteemed bureaucracy suggest 
that there is much than can go wrong when potentially mutually beneficial relationships 
between state officials and private businesses become entrenched over time. These are 
issues that are central to not only understanding the origins of the crisis itself, but of 
trying to judge its impact on the distinctive political and economic structures of East 
Asia. Key questions revolve around the continuing utility of coordinated forms of 
capitalism: Are such arrangements only useful in the earlier phases of industrialisation 
or ‘catching-up’? Do the enduring, cooperative relations between business and 
government that facilitate planned economic development inevitably risk descending 
into self-serving venality?  In the longer-term, do the processes associated with 
‘globalisation’ make such relationships either unsustainable or irrelevant?  
 
A number of responses to such questions are presented by the authors in this volume. 
Weiss and Hobson, for example, consider that the ‘strong’ states of  Northeast Asia in 
particular can ‘convert external constraints into domestic opportunities’, and emerge 
comparatively well from the crisis. Similarly, James Cotton argues that the ‘enterprise 
associations’ of Singapore and Taiwan provided a rational and structural basis for a 
specific form of economic and political organisation that has insulated  these countries 
from the worst ravages of the crisis. However, Hyuk Rae Kim argues that the capacity of 
even the most technocratically competent of East Asian states to respond effectively has 
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been fundamentally undermined by the crisis. Kim’s other chapter with Yeon-Ho Lee, 
which considers South Korea’s experience, gives a good deal of support to this 
proposition. Perhaps Kanishka Jayasuriya’s paper points the way forward from some of  
these apparently incommensurate positions: it is not so much a question of  an absence 
or diminution of the state’s regulatory effectiveness, but of  new forms of regulation. In 
other words, even in the face of an apparently relentless tide of IMF-inspired neoliberal 
reform, governments are involved in a process of re-regulation rather than de-regulation 
(Vogel 1996; Cerny 1991).  
 
There is another point that merits re-emphasis in any discussion of the role of the state in 
the region: that is, the importance of distinguishing between the different versions of the 
‘East Asian model’.  A consideration of the Southeast Asian experience suggests that 
while the Japanese exemplar may have exerted an influence, its realisation in a 
Southeast Asian context generally owes little to the stylised – not to say idealised – 
depictions of technocratic elites promoting the collective good. On the contrary, a 
country like Indonesia, dominated as it has been by a close knit oligarchy that has been 
the principle beneficiary of economic development, is closer to a ‘predatory’ state than 
the developmentalist ideal (see Evans 1995). True, Indonesia’s economic  development 
has generated more widely-dispersed benefits than has been the case in comparable 
African regimes, but the locus of political and economic power has remained with the 
dominant politico-bureaucratic elite. Indeed, the point to emphasise in the Indonesian 
case is that state power has been utilised to cement the position of elite itself, not in the 
pursuit of some more broadly based conception of the national interest (Robison 1997). 
 
Although the Indonesian case is perhaps extreme, it is not unique. A number of countries 
in the region have demonstrated a potential for predatory statism (Hutchcroft 1994), or 
for the more entrenched fusion of political and economic power that characterises a 
country like Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo 1997). The chapters by Robison and Rosser on 
Indonesia, Hewison on Thailand, Walden Bello on the Philippines, and Khoo Boo Teik’s 
analysis of the Malaysian experience suggest that the crisis itself and the reformist 
ambitions of both external and internal actors will profoundly affect domestic political-
economies across Southeast Asia. If, as seems increasingly likely, the crisis drags on and 
intensifies, then the possibility that such reforms will either generate nationally-based 
forms of resistance or create further instability by accentuating domestic tensions is all 
too real. As Beeson and Bell indicate in their consideration of Australia, even a country 
which has enthusiastically embraced neoliberal reform is not immune from the 
discomforting economic and political  impacts of increased international integration.  In 
short, the preconditions  for what Higgott calls the ‘politics of resentment’ are in place 
across the entire region.  
 
Nowhere are the social complexities of the crisis more apparent than in the potential for 
inter-ethnic conflict, particularly involving the so-called ‘overseas Chinese’. Although 
we need to be careful about homogenising a large number of people from increasingly 
disparate national contexts under this convenient rubric (Brown 1998), there are, 
nevertheless, sufficient commonalities about Chinese business practices to allow 
Chinese capitalism to stand as another ideal-typical entity. Chinese capitalism continues 
to reflect the  social, institutional and cultural milieu within which it is embedded 
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(Redding 1990), and represents – along with the Japanese variant described above – an 
important generic form that could play a potentially  important role in the resolution of 
the crisis, especially in Southeast Asia. As such, it continues to be characterised by a 
relatively small scale, family-centred business structures, which generally substitute 
personalism for the supposed rationality of its Anglo-American counterparts. In short, 
different relationships and connections (guanxi) provide the underpinning basis for a 
complex network-based organisational structure that will not be easily altered by 
neoliberal reforms and calls for ‘transparency’. Indonesia is perhaps the most obvious 
illustration of both the economic importance and political influence of Chinese 
capitalism and of the potential for such relationships to generate widespread social 
unrest. 
 
The final point to make about this brief sketch of Asian capitalism is that the  theoretical 
and ideological prism through which the East Asian experience is refracted will 
inevitably colour subsequent conclusions. The theoretical assumptions of much 
neoliberal economic thought, particularly the normative and methodological privileging 
of the individual rather than the group (or more specifically in the current regional 
context, the network), means that many of the most distinctive qualities of East Asian 
capitalism are simply not captured (Biggart and Hamilton 1992). The type of theoretical 
paradigm that is employed, therefore, is likely to determine not only the way we see, or 
indeed define problems for analysis, but the sorts of policies that are put in place as a 
consequence. This possibility is most obvious in the link between the neoclassical 
tradition  of economic thought which has assumed such a paramountcy in the Anglo-
American nations, and the normative pursuit (or imposition) of market-centred reforms 
(Gordon 1994). We shall critically assess a number of the more useful or influential 
theoretical perspectives in the final part of this chapter. Before that, however, it is 
important to situate East Asian forms of capitalism in their overarching and increasingly 
‘global’ context. 
 
East Asia and Globalisation 
  
In a number of analyses of the crisis writers from a range of backgrounds, from orthodox 
liberal economists like Jeffrey Sachs (1997), to the more radical perspective of Jeffrey 
Winters (this volume), have stressed the importance of the global financial system in 
precipitating the crisis.  Such views raise a number of important questions. First, what 
specific  changes in the international political economy may have been implicated in the 
crisis? Second, what are the implications of such changes for nation-states? In short, is it 
still possible for a range of national or regional responses to be generated to apparently 
ubiquitous international pressures, as the analysis of  Higgott (this volume) or the recent 
actions of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir seem to suggest? These are critical 
questions, for if global financial markets in particular and the reconfigured international 
system in general are responsible for a crisis that shows every sign of affecting non-
Asian economies, then dismantling ‘crony capitalism’ or discouraging dirigiste regimes 
may do little to address the underlying structural problems of capitalism per se.  
 
In order to answer some of these questions, we need to be clear about how capitalism 
has evolved generally. This section, therefore, sketches the most important structural 
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developments in the interconnected, international economic and political system, 
changes which are routinely subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalisation’. 
 
The industrial and financial  sectors 
 
The most visible expression of East Asia’s incorporation into what is an increasingly 
global economy has been, until recently at least, its role in what has been dubbed the 
‘new international division of labour’ (Frobel et al 1978). A number of changes in the 
way productive processes are organised over recent years have allowed production to be 
dissaggregated and spatially dispersed over a number of locations that may transcend 
national borders (Dicken 1992). While the region has clearly enjoyed a number of 
benefits from its integration into global production processes and networks, the crisis has 
had the effect of revealing  a number of long-term structural problems in the underlying 
‘real’ economies of both the region and wider international system. 
 
Inward investment flows associated with new, internationally-organised structures of  
production are now generally welcomed, if not actively pursued by host nation 
governments. Although East Asia has attracted increasingly significant flows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), they have recently tended to be overwhelming directed toward 
one country – China. As Lance Gore points out in Chapter ??, China’s own political and 
economic practices in combination with new inflows of capital have contributed to a 
major build up in the region’s manufacturing capacity.  This is exacerbating an historical 
crisis of excess productive capacity and declining profitability throughout the world, a 
growing problem that has been manifest in increasingly intense inter-regional 
contestation between the North America, Europe and East Asia (Brenner 1998). This not 
only makes any immediate, export-led recovery from the present crisis more difficult, 
but directs attention to potentially more fundamental problems with capitalism in 
general. The remarkable increases in the productivity of manufacturing processes in 
particular has generated the preconditions for a systemic crisis centred on a major 
imbalance between supply and demand. The crisis, therefore,  may be highlighting a 
global, rather than a simply East Asian problem of structurally entrenched 
unemployment, saturated markets and chronic over-capacity (Greider 1997). 
 
These problems have been compounded by the prominent role played by financial 
capital during the crisis. Financial capital is most easily distinguished from FDI by its 
more attenuated relationship with ‘real’ economic activity. Simply put, financial capital 
is not directly involved in or committed to long-term involvement in productive 
activities, but operates through a range of intermediaries or financial instruments which 
allow its controllers to maintain a high degree of potential  mobility. In other words, 
financial capital can move rapidly in and out of national economic space in response to 
changing circumstances. This has become a especially critical issue in an era when by 
some estimates up to US$2 trillion passes through the world’s currency markets every 
day, of which more than 97 per cent is speculative and unconnected with the production 
of goods and services (Lietar 1997: 15). The scale, scope and visibility of the markets is 
significant enough in itself, but when combined with the apparent inherent historical 
tendency for  disjunctures to emerge in the pace of expansion in the financial and 
industrial spheres of international economic activity (Arrighi 1994), then the potential 
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for crises is compounded. Certainly, increasing volatility in global equity, bond and 
currency markets suggest that such systemic crises and  imbalances are not confined to 
the Eastern side of the Pacific. 
 
This is an even more important consideration given that  one of the more important 
aspects of the present crisis has been the so-called ‘contagion effect’, in which what 
were initially taken to be localised problems, rapidly spread to other countries. In the 
contemporary inter-linked world economy, individual nation-states, especially those 
with smaller economies, appear to be extremely vulnerable to rapid shifts in market 
sentiment (Beeson 1998). The relative size of the economic forces ranged against 
individual countries is of critical importance here. The dramatic growth of mutual funds 
and large-scale institutional investors in countries like the US means that where the 
governments of smaller economies have loosened control over domestic economic 
activity in line with international trends, then national currencies and the course of 
domestic development may be at the mercy of forces beyond the control of individual 
governments. While the degree of vulnerability or insulation experienced by individual 
countries is clearly variable and something that needs to be determined in specific 
circumstances, it seems plausible that much of the impact of the spreading crisis may be 
derived from the sheer increased scale and rapidity of financial sector movements.  
 
An inevitable corollary to the resolution  of the current crisis will be a re-examination, if 
not a reformulation of the regulatory framework within which capitalism operates. 
Inevitably, however, the construction of a new ‘financial architecture’  will be shaped by 
the constellations of political forces within nations, the varying power of individual 
nations in relation to each other, and the increasing influence of transnational or non-
state authorities.  Greater capital mobility  has had the effect of entrenching new 
domestic cleavages, not simply between ‘capital’ and labour, but within different 
elements of nationally- or internationally-oriented producers (Frieden 1991), and 
between them and the controllers of more liquid, footloose financial assets. An 
important impact of the internationalisation of economic activity, therefore, is to re-
configure the interests upon which domestic political coalitions rest (Milner and 
Keohane 1996: 16). 
 
The potential importance of this realignment of domestic forces in response to 
international pressures is clearly demonstrated  in the case of Japan, the most important 
economic actor within East Asia. To put the matter briefly, changes in the international 
financial system have not only reduced the ability of Japanese state officials to manage 
the domestic economy, but have affected the nature of the relationships between the 
financial and industrial sectors within Japan. A key change in this regard has been  the 
growth of disintermediated credit in the Japanese system. In other words, the control and 
more particularly the allocation of credit has steadily moved beyond the purview of 
governmental control (Leyshon 1994).  Not only is this a profound transformation of 
domestic political relations and the relative influence of key actors within Japan’s 
political economy, but it is emblematic of a fundamental challenge to the very basis of 
East Asian capitalism. The distinctive East Asian form of a credit-based capital 
provision, (rather than the Anglo-American market-based model of finance), in which 
the state and the domestic banking sector are the principal sources of credit allocation 
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(Zysman 1983), would seem to be directly threatened by the growing power and 
ubiquity of international financial  markets.  
 
State authority, and the entire interventionist style of economic development in East 
Asia appears to be inevitably diminished by the current crisis and the potential 
imposition of further neoliberal reforms. While the implications and extent of these 
changes need to be analysed in specific national contexts, there does seem to be prima 
facie evidence, therefore,  of a degree of ‘convergence’ in response to similar 
imperatives and structural constraints. Importantly in the context of the East Asian crisis, 
however, there appears to be a desire on the part of key transnational authorities and 
actors to try and encourage a process of convergence, or even impose structures and 
practices which conform to ‘western’ idealisations. In short, there is an increasingly 
important and overt political dimension to the globalisation process.  
 
 
The politics of globalisation 
 
The idea that the authority of nation-states is seriously compromised by processes 
associated with globalisation  has become one of the staples of popular and academic 
commentary (Ohmae 1996). Yet as we saw in the case of Japan,  while the 
internationalisation of economic activity does have the effect of re-configuring the 
relative power of domestic political forces,  this does not necessarily imply that the state 
itself is a less effective or important actor as a result. Clearly, any form of capitalism is 
ultimately dependent for its long-term realisation and continuance on the sort of 
legitimating authority and  legal infrastructure that only nation-states can provide 
(Heilbroner 1985).  And yet there clearly have been important changes in the state’s 
position, especially as a consequence of the internationalisation of economic activity. 
Susan Strange (1996: 43) argues that the ‘shift [of power] away from states towards 
markets is probably the biggest change in the international political economy in the last 
half of the twentieth century’. 
 
States, then, are bound up in a complex web of transnational relationships, 
interdependencies and commitments which play a fundamental role in defining not only 
their own position and power, but also the shape of the increasingly multilateral 
international system of which they are a part. Yet the international political-economy 
which has evolved in the post-war period is a particular sort of system, one which 
reflects the interests,  preferences and power of its members. Increasingly, the rules and 
norms that govern the contemporary international system are associated with so-called 
‘Washington consensus’, which is predicated upon market-centred  polices of 
privatisation and  liberalisation (see Williamson 1994). In short, the consolidation of 
neoliberal policies is associated with a range of reforms and initiatives that are designed 
to both entrench the position of market mechanisms and to advantage those firms and 
nations that are best able to take advantage of them. In other words,  a critical issue 
highlighted by the crisis is whether  market-centred reforms are simply  a-political 
technical responses to particular economic difficulties, or whether they are part of a 
wider agenda of reform designed to further particular national interests. 
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The role played by the International Monetary Fund in attempting to manage this crisis 
highlights many of these issues, as Richard Leaver demonstrates in chapter ?? Given that  
IMF not only symbolises the new reality of inter-governmental relations, but has also 
been the most important and visible agent of neoliberal reform, it is worth making a 
couple of brief additional points about this key organisation. The major point to 
emphasise is the thorougoing nature of the reforms being proposed by the IMF. As 
Robison and Rosser argue in chapter??, the IMF reform agenda is designed to ‘strike at 
the heart of politico-business and conglomerate power’. In other words, the IMF is not 
simply interested in attempting to stabilise immediate economic dislocation in Indonesia, 
but in making profound long-term changes to the organisation of economic and political  
activity in Indonesia. Given the intimate historical association between the IMF and the 
US and its foreign policy goals (Pauly 1997), then it is reasonable to ask whether the key 
inter-governmental institution charged with resolving the crisis is pursuing a politically 
neutral agenda of exclusively economic reform, or one which is shot-through with 
national implications and political imperatives. As Higgott (chapter ??) argues, it is a 
perception that may provide a lightening rod for regional resentment and future conflict. 
 
As the very different perspectives taken in this volume by Winters on the one hand and 
Weiss and Hobson on the other demonstrate, there is clearly an important debate about 
the role played by the US in attempts to reconfigured East Asian political–economies. 
What can be said is that the end of the Cold War has profoundly reduced  East Asia’s 
strategic leverage over the US, and opened up a possibly unique, historic window of 
opportunity for those forces that which to restructure political and economic activity in 
the region along more ‘western’ lines. This raises a further and critically important 
question: why do economic systems change? In other words, why do market orders 
function differently form one country to the next? In order to try and unravel this key 
question and begin to make theoretical sense of the crisis, we shall critically review a 
number of the more important and influential perspectives that have tried to make sense 
of East Asia and capitalist development more generally.  
 
 
Understanding Outcomes: How Do Markets Change? 
 
In the face of overwhelming pressures to reform, it is striking that change in the region 
has been contested and uneven.  As a number of the contributors to this volume 
demonstrate, entrenched interests across the region continue to resist change.  
Opposition comes from vested business interests under threat from proposed bankruptcy 
laws, trade reform and the closure of insolvent banks, as well as from middle classes and 
workers for whom high interest rates, inflation and fiscal contraction undermine the 
gains of the past two decades. The varied impacts and effects of the crisis on the region 
raise broader questions about the way economic structures and social systems change. 
 
How do we understand such contests?  Do they represent the final struggles of rent-
seekers and predators in the face of the inexorable, timeless and universal rationality of 
market mechanisms?  Or are they conflicts between contending systems of power and 
interest?  Are free markets and political democracy functionally necessary for 
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capitalism?  Or are these simply the institutions that emerged from the circumstances in 
which capitalism arose in nineteenth century Europe?  Can market economies exist 
within a range of institutional frameworks including political authoritarianism?  There 
are a number of theoretical perspectives that might be utilised in trying to answer such 
questions, which for the sake of convenience we have divided into a neoliberal 
perspective, a paradigm which sees markets as constructions of government and politics, 
and theorists who see markets as structured by relations of power and interest. 
 
 
 Neo-Liberal explanations    
 
In contradiction to their previous optimism that the ‘Asian Miracle’ would continue into 
the Asian Century on the basis of sound economic ‘fundamentals’ (Radelet and Sachs 
1997), neo-liberals have explained the crisis as an inevitable functional breakdown of 
economies in which governments attempt to resist the rationality of markets (Friedman 
1997; Camdessus 1997). As the cost of resisting markets becomes too high, reflected in 
over-valued assets, poor investment decisions and burgeoning debt, rational individuals 
seek greater efficiencies in the allocation of economic resources through the natural and 
neutral mechanism of the market.  Likewise, individuals  seek to reduce transaction costs 
caused by lack of information and predicability by constructing rules and regulations to 
constrain the predatory actions of ‘rent-seeking’ officials and business interests (World 
Bank 1983; North 1994). 
 
Despite the elegant and frictionless process of change assumed above, neo-liberals have 
had to recognise the politically contested nature of economic transition.  These contests 
are seen as resistance by rent-seekers, who prosper from government intervention in the 
operation of  markets, and who capture both rents and the very institutions intended to 
regulate economic life (Krueger 1974; Olson 1982). Consequently, neo-liberals see the 
primary task as minimising the influence of the inevitably predatory institutions of state 
power (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). From this perspective, the crisis is a blessing in 
disguise. It offers an opportunity to dismantle protective trade and financial regimes, 
industry policies, and the structures of ‘crony capitalism’. Consequently, besieged 
governments seeking investment and debt rescheduling now find it increasingly difficult 
to resist demands from global funds managers and bankers to liberalise their trade 
regimes or to reform their banking systems. As IMF Chief, Camdessus’ has argued, to 
receive the benefits of global financial markets countries had to adhere to its disciplines 
(cited in Saludo and Shameen 1997). Yet, neo-classical theorists confront a 
contradiction. They have increasingly recognised that it is only within institutions able to 
stand above vested interests that collective problems may be resolved.  Hence the 
emphasis placed on institution building and ‘good governance’ and the recognition that 
the state has a role to play (World Bank 1997. 
 
Neo-liberal approaches, therefore, embody several major problems.  First, if the utility-
maximising individual is the engine of change, how are collective interests identified 
and institutions established to enforce them? Chaudhry’s (1997) question is central:  
who should manage these institutions and on what basis? A second problem lies in the 
assumption that markets are mechanisms abstracted from state power and social and 
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political interest. The view that changing institutions is a technical matter is contradicted 
by the continuing inability to impose deregulation and craft ‘good governance’ in the 
form of transparent and accountable institutions.  In Indonesia, for example, attempts in 
1965, 1982 and 1986 to impose liberal market reform failed because economic crises did 
not break the dominant political and social order.  Such cases suggest that market 
economies may require specific social and political pre-conditions.      
 
 
Markets as the Creations of Governments and Politics 
 
Following the traditions of Weber and Polanyi, a range of theorists, including Chalmers 
Johnson and John Zysman have argued that markets do not exist in isolation from state 
power, and are not timeless, universal essences, but the creations of government and 
politics (Zysman 1994). Developmental elites within the state apparatus, in this view, 
can and do create specific market structures through a range of coordinated industry 
policies, strategic trade initiatives,  and financial regimes.  In Wade’s (1990) 
terminology, these are managed or governed markets.   What is more, they often survive, 
as Amsden (1989: 13/14) pointed out, by countering the conventional wisdom of the 
market and ‘getting  prices wrong.’ 
 
In this view, markets do not exist independently of the institutions that define them.  
Because change occurs in the context of historically-determined institutional pathways, 
crises are accommodated within a central logic defined by layers of institutions - 
whether they be British trade union systems of labour or the credit-based industrial 
economies of Japan or France.  Hence, in this view there is not one form of capitalism 
but many. Such an explanation has the advantage of explaining why it is so difficult to 
change economic systems and why apparently similar institutions when translated from 
one society to another often produce different outcomes.   
 
But the crisis appears to have seriously damaged the statist position. High-debt strategies 
balanced on collusive arrangements between governments, banks and business were left 
vulnerable as the currencies collapsed. It appears that state managed or governed 
markets may indeed contain essential functional flaws. Statist theorists have explained 
the crisis, not as evidence of the irrationality of governed or managed markets but as the 
consequence of foolish and imprudent reforms that led to the collapse of institutional 
capacity (Weiss and Hobson, this volume). Hence, the current task is to restore the 
institutional framework that made previous systems so successful. 
 
There are several difficulties in this approach.  Change is explained in terms of 
incremental rational choices that produce historical layers of institutions which in turn 
impart a degree of path dependency.  There is a tendency to reify  institutions to the 
extent that we are unable to explain great shifts in history and the dramatic collapse of 
existent institutional frameworks as other than mistakes in design by developmental 
elites.  This is the case in the present crisis (Wade and Veneroso 1998).  However, 
reforms to economic regimes in the 1980s were not simply foolish miscalculations by 
bureaucratic elites, but the related shifts in political and social power that were reflected 
in policy and constitutional change, not least in the emergence of democratic politics.  
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Restoring the old institutions is not, therefore, a technical matter but one that implies 
nothing less than a social counter-revolution. The challenge for institutional theorists 
that seek to do more than simply describe institutional variety, therefore, is to define the 
boundary between optimal institutional embeddedness and the development of self-




Markets as Relations of Power and Interest   
 
In western social theories of markets,  originating largely from within the classical 
Marxist tradition, all economic systems are understood as relations of power and 
interest.  Consequently, the opponents of neoliberal reform  are not dismissed as rent-
seekers or vested interests, but as cohesive, entrenched political and social entities.  
Liberal market economies, no less than any other system, are embedded in particular 
constellations of state and social power.  Change occurs, in this view, when legal, 
political and economic institutions, which were established to facilitate particular 
systems of economic production and to impose the architecture of social relations 
embodied in them, become constraints on the emergence of a new order. Hence, 
institutions are constructed to maintain and allocate power, not just to impose rational 
economic regimes (Bardhan 1989).  The process of change involves political struggle to 
shape the rules that govern markets.  
 
Like neo-liberals, although for different reasons, Marxists have also assumed that 
capitalism would lead inexorably to the development of market economies and political 
democracy.  Embracing the globe, capitalism would contain within it a particular 
hierarchy of social power and interest, and involve a sweeping away of existing social 
order. The fact that capitalism has evolved within a wide range of institutional 
frameworks - from the highly centralised developmentalist states of Bismarck’s 
Germany and Meiji Japan to the predatory oligarchies of Indonesia and the Philippines – 
presented problems. While both liberal and Marxist theorists have explained such stages 
in terms of the absence or weakness of middle classes or business interests, this has not 
always been the case. Transitional stages are better  defined in terms of  different 
historical conjunctures of relationships and alliances between capitalists, the state and its 
officials, middle classes and workers (Marx 1969). Within the Marxist framework, it is 
assumed that these stages will be transcended as capitalism matures, markets are 
entrenched and the bourgeoisie achieves a hegemony that renders their protection under 
the umbrella of authoritarian states and dirigiste economic systems no longer necessary 
(Harris1988).  
 
Within this paradigm, the crisis may be explained in the context of two questions.  Will 
it undermine the structural base of entrenched political and social coalitions, or are they 
able to accommodate such challenges?  Moreover, even if existing regimes decay as 
they succumb to fiscal crisis and social unrest, is there any guarantee that liberal market 
economies will spontaneously emerge? As a number of contributions to this volume 
suggest, a retreat to oligarchy, nationalism or a decline into chaos are possibilities that 
can not be ruled out. A second question, therefore, is whether the crisis strengthens 
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reformist coalitions whose interests are served by markets, rule of law and political 
democracy. 
 
There are, then, a number of theoretical frameworks with which it is possible to try and 
make sense of the current crisis. While they may all have something to tell us, the key 
test of their efficacy is their ability to illuminate the contingent dynamics that have 
shaped recent events. While capitalism may display some universal properties,  any 
plausible account of the crisis must recognise that capitalism in Asia has been realised in 
distinctive ways that will not easily be swept aside, nor which will inevitably or 
painlessly ‘converge’ an a supposedly technically superior western model. Indeed, as the 
crisis threatens to spill over into the rest of the world - including North America - the 
Anglo-American variant of capitalism may come in for an equally searching scrutiny 
which may remind us of the contradictory and crisis-prone nature of capitalism in 





This chapter has tried to place Asian capitalism in a specific historical context and 
identify some of the key issues that will influence its future development in the wake of 
the crisis. One of the most noteworthy features that has emerged from the crisis has been 
the extraordinary change in perceptions of the region and its prospects.  It is important  
to remember that until very recently key international institutions like the IMF and the 
World Bank (1993; 1997) had nothing but praise for the developmental states and the 
primacy they attached to ‘getting the fundamentals right’ (Berger and Beeson 1998). Not 
only do orthodoxies change, it seems, but some views are clearly more salient than 
others in constructing the conventional wisdom. It is not necessary to be a Marxist to 
recognise that powerful nations are able to use their positions’ to make their visions of 
the way the world works pre-eminent (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990), and thus the basis 
for ‘cooperative’ international actions. As a number of contributors to this volume note 
(see, for example, Winters), the overarching geo-strategic framework within which inter-
regional relations are conducted has been transformed in the wake of the Cold War’s 
end. The US, often through  IMF auspices, has attempted to re-shape East Asia and its 
institutions along neoliberal lines, unconstrained by formerly dominant strategic  
imperatives (Beeson forthcoming). In short, it is inconceivable that the crisis would have 
unfolded in quite the way it has if the central dynamic of the international system had 
not shifted from ‘high’ politics to ‘low’ commerce (Luttwak 1990). 
 
There are, then, powerful international forces associated with both the creation and the 
attempted resolution of the East Asian crisis. It is worth reiterating some of the key 
questions that have emerged from this chapter, and which will need to be addressed - 
either explicitly or implicitly – if the crisis is to be resolved. First and foremost, is the 
crisis a crisis of capitalism or of East Asian capitalism? Are Asian economic and 
political structures – even in their most technocratically competent and benign Northeast 
Asian manifestations – simply unable to adapt to or cope with the seemingly irresistible 
array of forces associated with globalisation? Or is the East Asian crisis a manifestation 
of some more fundamental and possibly new or heightened ‘contradiction’ of capitalism 
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itself? In short, how much of East Asia’s problems are due the domestic incompetence 
or corruption, and how much to an international economic system that is fundamentally 
unstable and which may ultimately affect the North American and European legs of the 
Triad? 
 
Other more immediate questions concern East Asia more directly. Despite the economic 
origins of the crisis, the key questions that flow from it are political. Put simply, how 
will the crisis affect domestic and international political relations? The dramatic 
downfall of the Suharto regime suggests that if the crisis drags on or becomes worse – as 
seems all too likely – there may be further political trauma in the region. Will this 
encourage democratisation as optimists hope, or will the pressures exerted by collapsing 
economies and concomitant social unrest see a move back toward authoritarianism? 
Indeed, will there be a backlash against the entire project of further neoliberal reform – 
and its extra-regional sponsors -  especially if it is unable to deliver any obvious benefits 
in the short to medium term? The period between the two World Wars provides a 
sobering reminder that there is nothing inevitable about the course of economic 
development or international relations. 
 
If the current economic dislocation ultimately proves to have more to do with a crisis of 
capitalism, than it has to do with a crisis of Asian capitalism, then the vectors of 
influence and admonition that are currently pointing unwaveringly toward the region 
may be reversed. In the event of a more generalised global crisis of capitalism engulfing 
North America and Europe, then the sort of state-led economic strategies that East Asia 
perfected may well prove valuable again. And yet this may highlight a key paradox if 
not contradiction of the crisis: it is possible to argue that some there are still aspects of 
Asian capitalism – particularly its capacity for coordination and its potential for a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits of economic development - that make it 
functionally superior to it Anglo-American counterpart. But in an era where power is 
increasingly shifting from states to markets, and in which the world’s most powerful 
nation cooperates with increasingly influential inter-governmental authorities to impose 
a market- rather than a state-centred economic order, the East Asian model will not 
survive unless there is a transformation of the wider system of which it is a part. As the 
crisis spreads and the more questions are asked about the stability and efficacy of a 
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